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We study the consumption behaviour of an asymmetric network of heterogeneous agents in the
framework of discrete choice models with stochastic decision rules. We assume that the interactions
among agents are uniquely specified by their “social distance” and consumption is driven by peering,
distinction and aspiration effects. The utility of each agent is positively or negatively affected by
the choices of other agents and consumption is driven by peering, imitation and distinction effects.
The dynamical properties of the model are explored, by numerical simulations, using three different
evolution algorithms with: parallel, sequential and random-sequential updating rules. We analyze
the long-time behaviour of the system which, given the asymmetric nature of the interactions, can
either converge into a fixed point or a periodic attractor. We discuss the role of symmetric versus
asymmetric contributions to the utility function and also that of idiosyncratic preferences, costs and
memory in the consumption decision of the agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
A great body of research has been devoted to the ef-
fects that direct interactions among consumers or firms
have on macroeconomics variables (Brock 1995, Brock
and Durlauf 1995, Aoki 1996, Axelrod 1997, Albin 1998,
Chwe 2000). Direct interactions among economic agents,
usually referred to as social interactions (as opposed to
market mediated interactions) are meant to capture how
the decision of each individual is influenced by the choice
of others in his reference group. Direct interaction mod-
els can apply to coordination problems in general, rang-
ing from the emergence of collective political actions and
the development of fads and conventions to the explana-
tion of speculative bubbles in financial markets and the
dynamics of market penetration and diffusion of techno-
logical innovations.
Different alternatives have been considered in the lit-
erature: global interactions (Brock and Durlauf 1995),
where each individual tends to conform to the average
behaviour of the entire population, as well as local inter-
actions, where each individual has an incentive to con-
form to a specified group of neighbours (Fo¨llmer 1974,
Durlauf 1993, Blume 1993, Corneo 1994, Morris 2000).
This last case has recently gained interest in economics,
following the observation that network externalities are
often localized. A stochastic interaction picture has also
been considered. This can be implemented by consid-
ering either fixed, exogenously determined, random com-
munication links between any pair of agents or, by taking
time-dependent links and letting the neighbouring com-
position evolve in a self-organized way (Benabou 1996,
Durlauf 1996). In this case, agents would be able to
form new alliances according to some fitness maximiza-
tion scheme. Moreover, links among agents can be of
varying strength, often positive and negative (Axelrod
1997, Galam 2000), to account for the different external-
ities an agent receives from the behaviour of the other
agents, depending not only on where they are but also
on who they are.
Nonetheless, in the literature the attention has been
mainly focused on the case of positive, pairwise symmet-
ric, spillover, i.e. the case where the payoff of a particu-
lar action increases when others behave similarly. In this
context, it has been shown that the evolution is diffusive:
even in the case of heterogenous agents, social interac-
tions create conformity in behaviour or polarized group
behaviour without relying on the presence of correlated
characteristics among members of the same group. While
models with symmetric interactions have given numerous
insights in a variety of contexts, from a sociological point
of view the constraint of symmetric interactions is un-
satisfactory. Two agents do not need to influence one
another in the same manner. Therefore it is natural to
investigate models with asymmetric couplings between
agents.
Non-symmetric pairwise interactions, although com-
mon in the study of neural networks and other biological
systems (Kauffman 1969, see also Mu¨ller et al. 1995 for a
review), have only recently been introduced in economics
(Akerlof 1997, Kirman 1997, Samuelson 1997). In a re-
cent work, Cowan, et al. (1998), introduced a model of
consumption behaviour, herefrom called the CCS model,
where the utility of an individual agent is positively or
negatively affected by the choices of other agents and con-
sumption is driven by peering, imitation and distinction
effects. In the CCS model, the microeconomic agents
have pairwise interactions which are specified by a func-
tion of a single parameter, their “social distance” such as,
for example, differences is wealth (where the wealth can
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be a random variable). Consumers are ordered according
to their social status and are affected by the behaviour of
other agents depending on their relative location on the
spectrum. Agents wish to distinguish themselves from
those who are below and emulate their peers and those
who are above in the social spectrum. The interplay be-
tween aspiration and distinction effects can generate con-
sumption waves, which propagate through the system.
The CCS model has been analyzed in the framework
of random utility discrete choice models, extending the
literature there by combining both local and global ex-
ternality effects. Discrete choice models start from the
assumption that each agent faces a set of mutually exclu-
sive alternatives, and chooses the one that yields greatest
utility (see Anderson et al. (1992) for a review). Two
families of models have been introduced to analyze the
choice process in a probabilistic setting. The first family
of models assumes that the decision rule is deterministic
but the utility is stochastic. The idea behind this as-
sumption is that even though individual behaviour might
be deterministic, the modeler can only imperfectly ob-
serve the factors that influence individual choice and only
has an imperfect knowledge of the utility function of each
agent. Models in the second family assume that the util-
ity is deterministic but the choice process is stochastic.
These models capture the idea of bounded rationality of
economic agents (Sargent 1995). Even if utility is deter-
ministic, individuals might make an error in evaluating
the importance of one or another characteristic associ-
ated with a certain alternative and do not necessarily
select what is best for them. The CCS model lies in the
first category, namely that of random utility models with
interacting agents. In this paper we reformulate the CCS
model and adopt the alternative description, that of the
choice as a stochastic process with the utility being de-
terministic.
Discrete choice models have been analyzed using the
techniques of statistical mechanics. In the case of sym-
metric interactions, the equilibrium condition can be ex-
pressed in terms of the Boltzman distribution. This is no
more the case in models with asymmetric interactions.
As a consequence, the long time behaviour of the system
has to be calculated by solving the dynamical problem
(which in most cases is not possible analytically) and
cannot be evaluated by equilibrium ensemble averages.
We use numerical simulations with Glauber dynamics
(Glauber 1963) to explore, the dynamical properties of
the model. We implement three different evolution algo-
rithms with: parallel, sequential and random-sequential
updating rules, depending on the order on which indi-
vidual agents update their decision. We first focus on
the deterministic limit and study the attractors of the
model, which determine the steady state, long-time be-
haviour of the consumption behaviour. Depending on the
evolution algorithm as well as the degree of the asym-
metry the attractors can be either fixed points or limit
cycles. We then introduce noise in the system and study
how this affects the dynamics of consumption. Eventu-
ally, extending the analysis of CCS we discuss the role
of costs and memory in the consumption decision of the
agents and consider different scenarios for the connectiv-
ity among the economic agents.
In section II we set the general framework by reviewing
briefly the theory of discrete choice models in a stochas-
tic environment. In section III we present our model in
terms of the interactions and the possible evolution mech-
anisms. Section IV contains results from our simulations
while section V conclude.
II. DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS
Discrete choice models can be formalized (Brock and
Durlauf 1995, Durlauf 1997) by considering a population
of N individuals, where each individual i chooses Si with
support (−1, 1). The set of all possible sets of actions
by the population, denoted by Ω, consists of all N-tuples
S˜ = (S1, . . . , SN ).
In the following we briefly review the basic ideas of
both stochastic utility and stochastic decision rule ap-
proaches.
A. Stochastic utility models
This problem has been formulated initially in the case
of non interacting agents (Anderson et al. 1992) and
has been subsequently generalized by Brock and Durlauf
(1995) to the case with social interactions.
Individual utility Ui(Si) consists of two components, a
deterministic term plus a random component:
Ui(Si) = Vi(Si) + ǫi(Si) (1)
The probability that an individual chooses Si = 1 is given
by
P (Si = 1) = P (Vi(1) + ǫi(1) > Vi(−1) + ǫi(−1)) (2)
or
P (Si = 1) = P (ǫi(−1)− ǫi(1) < Vi(1)− Vi(−1)) (3)
To solve the problem one needs to make some assump-
tion about the distribution of the random terms. The
random disturbances are assumed independent and iden-
tically distributed across agents, and are known at the
time agents take their decision. Let f(ǫ) be the distribu-
tion of ǫ = ǫ(1)− ǫ(−1). Then
P (Si = 1) =
∫ Vi(−1)−Vi(1)
−∞
f(x)dx (4)
If f(x) is logistically distributed with zero mean and vari-
ance µ
P (ǫ ≤ z) = 1
1 + exp(−z/µ) (5)
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then
P (Si = 1) =
eUi(1)/µ
eUi(1)/µ + eUi(−1)/µ
(6)
The generalization to multiple choices is possible if the
double exponential distribution is assumed for the noise
P (ǫi ≤ z) = exp(−(exp(−z/µ+ γ))) (7)
where γ is the Euler’s constant (γ ∼ 0.5772). In this case
P (Si = νi) =
eVi(νi)/µ∑n
j=1 e
Vj(νj)/µ
(8)
This problem has been generalized by Brock and
Durlauf, when social externalities affect agents’ decisions,
by taking into account an extra term in the utility func-
tion:
Ui(Si) = ui(Si) + si(Si, µ
e(S˜−i)) + ǫi(Si) (9)
where ui(Si) represent agent’s i deterministic private
utility, si(Si, µ
e(S˜−i)) represent his/her deterministic so-
cial utility, and ǫ(Si) represents a random private utility.
The term µe(S˜−i) denotes the conditional probability
measure agent i places on the choices of others at the time
of making his own decision. Brock and Durlauf write the
social utility as
si(Si, µ
e(S˜−i)) =
∑
j∈Gi
JijSiEi[Sj ] (10)
where Gi is the reference group of agent i and Ei[.] repre-
sent the conditional expectation operator associated with
agent i’s beliefs. Jij represent the interaction weight
which relates i’s choice to j’s choice. The Jij are cho-
sen equal to 1 if a link between a pair (i, j) exist and
zero eitherways. Within this framework, choosing a par-
ticular realization of Jij , the interactions among agents
are completely specified.
The private utility ui(Si) is assumed to depend linearly
on Si:
ui(Si) = hiSi (11)
where the hi can be chosen the same for all agents or can
have different values for different i if we assume heteroge-
neous agents. Note that hi plays the role of an external
field, affecting the decision of agent i. Analogously, the
social utility term can be interpreted as an internal field
generated by the agents themselves. Defining
hti = hiSi +
1
N
∑
j∈Gi
JijEi[Sj ] (12)
the deterministic component of the utility becomes
Vi(Si) = h
t
iSi. (13)
Note we have rescaled the interactions Jij , dividing by
N , in order to keep Ui finite as N →∞.
If the ǫ(Si) are independent across agents, the joint
probability measure over all agents choices equals:
P (S˜) =
N∏
i=1
Pi(Si) (14)
and we can rewrite eq.(9) as
P (S˜) =
exp (
∑N
i=1 Vi(νi)/µ)∑
ν1
...
∑
νN
exp(
∑N
i=1 Vi(νi)/µ)
(15)
B. Stochastic decision rules models
Following the observation that adjustments to the be-
haviour of economic agents are often made at discrete
points in time and are of finite magnitude, one can use
jump Markov processes to model the evolutionary dy-
namics of a large collection of interacting microeconomic
agents (Aoki 1996). Interactions of microeconomic units
can then be specified in terms of transition probabilities
of Markov chains (discrete Markov process with finite
state-space). The initial condition and the state transi-
tion probability completely characterize the time evolu-
tion of a discrete-time Markov chain. The time evolu-
tion of the probabilities of states in terms of transition
rates and the state’s occupancy probability is given by
the master equation:
∂P (x′, t)
∂t
=
∑
x 6=x′
P (x, t)w(x′|x, t)−
∑
x 6=x′
P (x′, t)w(x|x′, t)
(16)
where x, x′ denote state space variables. From this equa-
tion one sees that for the stationary or equilibrium prob-
ability to exist the (full) balance condition should be sat-
isfied: ∑
x 6=x′
Pe(x)w(x
′|x) =
∑
x 6=x′
Pe(x
′)w(x|x′) (17)
If moreover the probability flow balances for every pair
of states (x, y), i.e. the detailed balance condition holds
Pe(x)w(y|x) = Pe(y)w(x|y) (18)
it can be shown that the equilibrium distribution is path
independent. More precisely, denoting by Ω the space
state of a Markov chain, if we assume that the Markov
chain is ergodic∗, any state xi ∈ Ω can be reached from
∗More precisely, the chain should be irreducible, aperiodic
and positive (see, for example, Hammersley and Handscomb
1975)
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an initial state x0 through a sequence of intermediate
states x1, x2, ..., xi−1 so that
Pe(xi) = Pe(x0)
i−1∏
k=0
w(xk+1|xk)/w(xk|xk+1). (19)
If the detailed balance condition holds it can be shown
that
Pe(xi) = Cw(x0|xi)/w(xi|x0) (20)
In other words Pe(x) is a Gibbs distribution
Pe(x) =
exp(V (x))∑
k∈Ω exp(V (k))
(21)
where
V (xi)− V (x0) = log(w(xi|x0)/w(x0|xi)). (22)
V (x), depending only on the state xi, is a potential. It
follows that any dynamical process, as long as it satisfies
the detailed balance condition with the same function
Pe, will reach the same asymptotic equilibrium distri-
bution of states and, from eq.(20), that the equilibrium
probability distribution is independent of the dynamical
trajectory in the configuration space.
Given a potential V (x) which we want to maximize
the problem eventually becomes to find the appropriate
transition probabilities which satisfy the detailed balance
condition with Pe(x) specified by eq.(21). The Glauber
dynamics, or heat-bath algorithm (Glauber 1963), serves
this purpose. In our formulation we want the potential
V (x) to be the total utility U(S˜) of the system. We
assume here that the utility is the same as the one given
in the previous section except for the random component
which is now missing:
Ui(Si) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
JijSiEi[Sj ] + hiSi (23)
The total utility U(S˜) of the system in the configuration
S˜ is then
U(S˜) =
N∑
i=1
Ui(Si) (24)
Accordingly, to the heat-bath algorithm the probabil-
ity of a agent i to take a value Si, where Si can only be
+1 or -1, is
Pr(Si) =
exp(βhtiSi)
exp(βhti) + exp(−βhti)
(25)
This can be interpreted as the choice process of our agents
not being entirely deterministic. Indeed, we are assum-
ing that there is a “noise” element in the agents’ decision
represented by a Glauber dynamics with a thermal agi-
tation characterized by a temperature T = 1/β which is
held fixed.
It is easy to show that the updating process described
by eq. (25) obeys the detailed balance condition with
Pe = exp(−βU(S˜)) if the Jij are symmetric, i.e. Jij =
Jji. Following Amit (1989), we note first that the proba-
bility for a agent i to go to a state Si only depends on the
final state of that agent and the states of all other agent,
who create the local field. Therefore the probability for
the system to go from a configuration S˜J , in which the
agent i is in state Si to a configuration S˜I , in which that
agent is in state −Si, is Pr(−Si)/N and the probabil-
ity to go from S˜I to S˜J is Pr(Si)/N (the denominator
expresses the probability to pick up that specific agent).
Hence
w(S˜I |S˜J)
w(S˜J |S˜I)
=
Pr(Si)
Pr(−Si) =
exp(βhtiSi)
exp(−βhtiSi)
= exp(βU(S˜I) + U(−βS˜J)) (26)
from where the detailed balance condition holds and
hence
Pe ∼ exp(βU(S˜)). (27)
Nonetheless if there are asymmetric interactions, i.e.
Jij 6= Jji the detailed balance condition, eq. (18) is no
longer valid, and the long time evolution of the system
does not necessarily converge to the Gibbs equilibrium
distribution defined in eq. (27). Even though nothing
can be said, a priori, in this case about the equilibrium
distribution, the heat-bath algorithm still gives a pre-
scription on how to introduce a dynamics which, by max-
imizing U(S˜), leads to an equilibrium state. Moreover,
given that the contribution of any asymmetric compo-
nent of the interactions to the total utility U(S˜) is zero
when calculating the double sum, U(S˜) would not be a
Lyapunov function in this case. We remind that in the
absence of a Lyapunov function the system is not forced
to approached a stable attractor state and limit cycles
can occur as well as fixed points.
Note that in eq. (25) we have not specified the order
of updating. Two versions of the dynamics have become
popular: the first assumes that all agents update their
state simultaneously at every discrete time step ti. The
state of the other agents is in this case considered to be
the one in the time interval ti−1. This type of dynam-
ics is called synchronous or parallel. The second kind of
dynamics is the asynchronous or sequential in which the
state of each agent is updated one by one. In this case
every agent coming up for a decision has full informa-
tion about the state of the other agents that have been
updated before him.
In the following sub-section we focus on the dynamics
at T = 0 (the deterministic limit) and review the main
results concerning the nature of the attractors when using
different updating rules.
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C. Dynamics
(a) Parallel (or synchronous) dynamics: At each time
step t, all agents re-evaluate simultaneously their con-
sumption decision, relative to that taken one step before,
on the basis of the utility Ui(t) they receive, according
to:
Si(t+ 1) = sgn(h
t
i) = sgn

 N∑
j=1
JijSj(t) + hi

 (28)
where we have implicitly absorbed the 1/N factor in the
definition of Jij and introduced for later convenience the
notation:
hti = hi +
∑
j 6=i
JijSj . (29)
(b) Sequential dynamics: This is the case of asyn-
chronous updating in which the state of each agent is
updated one by one in a serial manner, according to:
Si(t+ 1) = sgn

∑
j<i
JijSj(t+ 1) +
∑
j>i
JijSj(t) + hi


(30)
(c) Random sequential (Glauber) dynamics: This is an-
other case of asynchronous updating scheme, similar to
the previous case, with the difference though that the
order of updating is chosen randomly.
For both synchronous and asynchronous dynamics,
symmetric couplings Jij = −Jji is a sufficient condition
for the existence of detailed balance. Nonetheless the
form of the asymptotic distribution differs in the two dy-
namics. In the following, we briefly review the properties
of the three dynamical rules. One can draw a number
of general statements about the nature of fixed points,
without relying on the detailed form of Jij .
For asynchronous dynamics (sequential or random se-
quential) and symmetric Jij the distribution of configu-
rations relaxes eventually to the Boltzmann distribution
eq.(27).
In the noiseless (T = 0) case, each contribution to the
utility is increased (or remains constant) after each agent
i updates her decision, as can be seen from
Ui(t+ 1) = h
t
i(t)Si(t+ 1)
= hti(t)sgn(h
t
i(t)) = |hti(t)|
≥ hti(t)Si(t) = Ui(t). (31)
Since the total utility is bounded from above, in absence
of asymmetry the system will asymptotically be driven to
a fixed point attractor which is either a local or a global
maximum of the utility functional.
While in the case of symmetric interactions there exist
only fixed points, with asymmetric Jij cycles of longer
length appear. Eventually in the limit case of anti-
symmetric interactions (Jij = −Jji) Gutfreund, Reger
and Young (1987), have proved that there exist only 2-
cycles.
In the case of synchronous dynamics and symmetric
interactions the asymptotic distribution depends on β
(and consequently is non Gibbsian) and can only formally
be written in the Boltzmann form (Amit 1989):
Pe(S) ∼ exp(βUβ(S˜)) (32)
with
Uβ(S˜) = 1/β
∑
i
ln(2 cosh
(
βhti)
)
(33)
In the T → 0 (i.e. β →∞) limit Uβ(S˜) reduces to
Uˆ =
∑
j 6=i
JijSi(t)Sj(t− 1) + hiSi(t) (34)
The dynamical process now maximizes Uˆ (often called
the stability function), since
Uˆ(t+ 1) =
∑
i
hti(t)Si(t+ 1)
=
∑
i
hti(t)sgn(h
t
i(t)) =
∑
i
|hti(t)|
≥
∑
j
htj(t)Sj(t− 1) = Uˆ(t). (35)
If Jij is symmetric one sees that
∆Uˆ = Uˆ(t+ 1)− Uˆ(t)
=
∑
i
[Si(t+ 1)− Si(t− 1)]
∑
j 6=i
JijSj(t) (36)
implying that Uˆ(t + 1) ≥ Uˆ(t). The Uˆ(t) remains un-
changed either when the consecutive states are identical,
i.e. the system has reached a fixed point, or when the
two states alternate Si(t + 1) = Si(t − 1), i.e. the sys-
tem has reached a 2-cycle. The existence of 2-cycles with
symmetric interactions is a unique feature of synchronous
dynamics.
If, on the other hand Jij is antisymmetric, then Uˆ(t)
changes by
∆Uˆ = Uˆ(t+ 1)− Uˆ(t)
=
∑
i
[Si(t+ 1) + Si(t− 1)]
∑
j 6=i
JijSj(t) (37)
and thus, again ∆Uˆ(t) ≥ 0, where the equality holds
when Si(t+1) = −Si(t−1). Therefore, for antisymmetric
interactions the only attractors are 4-cycles, since the
first and the third states are inverses of each other, as
are the second and fourth state.
Eventually we remind that the number of fixed points
is the same for sequential, parallel and for random se-
quential dynamics.
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III. MODEL
We consider a population of N agents, ordered on a
one-dimensional space and labeled by a variable wi which
represents their position in the social spectrum and in
a broad sense their wealth. Agents’ wealth is chosen
randomly, from the uniform distribution in the interval
[0,W0], and does not change with time. In this paper,
wealth serves as an index of social status rather than
the source of a budget constraint, as discussed below. A
more realistic situation with consumers arranged over a
multidimensional space (accounting, for example, for dif-
ferences in age, education, etc.) should be considered,
but for simplicity we only use one parameter to charac-
terize the agents, namely their wealth.
According to our previous description, the state of our
population S˜(t) = (S1(t), . . . , SN(t)), evolves according
to a jump Markov process. Time evolves discretely and at
each step an agent i has a binary choice either to consume
one indivisible unit of a good in which case Si = 1, or not
to consume, in which case Si = −1. For some product
that exists, or appears for the first time in the market,
and given an initial state at time t = 0, each agent decides
whether to consume or not at every subsequent time step,
doing so if this action provides positive utility.
For example, a new restaurant opens at time zero and
in each subsequent time period agents decide whether to
visit it or not.
The utility function Ui(t) is specified in eq. (23). The
local field hi characterizes the intrinsic value of the good
to agent i. This term contains all private factors that
affect his consumption decision. A product with hi = 0
for all agents is called a “fashion” good, while a “status”
good has a positive intrinsic value that might be well-
suited to the characteristics or tastes of a particular class
of consumers.
Each agent interacts with all the others, and the cou-
pling constants Jij are functions of the agents’ status
according to:
Jij = −JA arctan(wi − wj) + JS
[π
2
− arctan |wi − wj |
]
(38)
The coefficients JA, JS are taken positive. The asymmet-
ric term, proportional to JA, gives a negative contribu-
tion to the utility function Ui if wi > wj and a positive
contribution if wi < wj . This means that agent i wishes
to distinguish herself from the poorer while imitating the
richer. The second contribution, proportional to JS , al-
ways generates positive utility and expresses peering ef-
fects among consumers of similar status. The level of
asymmetry k is defined by the ratio k = JA/JS . Both of
these contributions saturate with distance to a constant
value. In Fig. (1) Jij is plotted as a function of (wi−wj).
We shall further assume that agents make expectations
about the choice of others according to
−100 −50 0 50 100
wi−wj
−10
0
10
20
30
40
J ij
JA=1, JS=0
JA =1, JS=25
FIG. 1. Jij as a function of (wi − wj) for JA = 1 and
JS = 1, 25.
Ei[Sj(t)] =
1
M
M∑
m=1
αtSj(t−m) (39)
Various scenarios could be considered by changing the
length of the memory M of each agent and the weights,
α, that agents put on past realizations in the expectation
formation process. We have focused on the case
αt = e
−λt (40)
with λ > 0 simulating in this way a fading memory.
Eventually we introduce a set of parameters ci which
account both for the price of the good and for the id-
iosyncratic costs that each agent individually may face.
In our previous example of the restaurant, the cost ci
for a consumer may be larger (lower) if (s)he lives far-
ther (closer) to it. We assume that costs act merely as
thresholds and the decision of agent i on whether to buy
the good or not depends only on whether his utility of
buying one unit Ui is positive and larger than ci. This
means that in eq.(25, 28, 30)
hti → hti − ci. (41)
Nonetheless all agents are assumed to possess sufficient
liquidity at all points in time and wealth constraints are
never binding.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
We have performed computer simulations to study the
model in eq. (23, 38, 39) for each of the evolution algo-
rithms of section II C. We studied both the time evo-
lution of total consumption as well as the spatial distri-
bution of consumption across the social spectrum. We
explored the various patterns generated with different
choices of the parameters. Our plots refer to lattice size
N = 800. We have taken the agents’ wealth to be uni-
formly distributed in the interval (0,W0) withW0 = 100.
(a) M = 1, T = 0, G = 0, C = 0
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Initially we study the case of a fashion good which has
no intrinsic value for the consumers, i.e. hi = 0.
In analogy with Spin Glass models (Mezard et al.
1987) with asymmetric interaction† the nature of the at-
tractors depends in a complex manner on the level of
asymmetry k. Given the analogy between the two sys-
tems we briefly resume in the following some of the fea-
tures of the SK model. Nu¨tzel and Krey (1993) found
that only fixed points or periodic attractors with period
two are present in the nearly symmetric SK model while
longer attractors appear in the case of highly asymmet-
ric couplings (they locate the transition at kc ∼ 1/
√
3).
While in the nearly symmetric case the average length of
the attractor < l > (measured by the number of different
configurations the system goes through before repeating
an identical sequence) is independent of the system size,
N , the dependence of < l > is exponential in N for highly
asymmetric couplings. Moreover, very long transients are
present and the typical number of updates before the sys-
tem relaxes to the attractor grows as a power of N at low
asymmetry and is exponential in N for high asymmetry.
Furthermore the transient exhibits chaotic behaviour, i.e.
sensitive dependence on the initial conditions (Crisanti et
al. 1993).
In our model we do not observe the long transients be-
fore the system reaches the attractor, neither at high or
low asymmetry. Nonetheless we found an interesting de-
pendence of < l > on k which we report in the following.
For parallel dynamics and k → ∞, as we anticipated
in the previous section, the system only exhibits 4-cycles
(fig. (2a)) and consumption propagates very fast through
the social spectrum (fig. (3a)). Note that in fig. (3) time
increases from top to bottom and it is the rich who start
consuming first in order to distinguish themselves from
the poor.
The average length of the attractors as a function of
1/k is plotted in fig.(4). The behaviour of the system is
very different in the two regions of high and low asym-
metry. First of all we notice that in the large k limit the
length of the attractor varies a lot from configuration to
configuration (which explains the large error bars in the
inset of fig. (4)) while at low asymmetry the length is
practically independent from the realization of the Jij
(we also checked that in this regime the length of the
attractor is almost independent from the system size).
The spatial distribution of consumption also differs
in the two regions. At high asymmetry, as shown in
fig. (3b), consumption propagates across the social spec-
trum very fast. The difference with respect to the pre-
vious case is that now the location (in w) where agents
†Our model could be considered as a particular case of the
asymmetric SK model (Iori and Marinari 1997) with the cou-
plings taken according to eq. (38) instead of being chosen
randomly.
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FIG. 2. Total consumption with parallel dynamics as a
function of time for M = 1, T = 0, G = 0, C = 0 and, from
top to bottom, (a) k =∞, (b) k = 3, (c) k = 1/25.
stop/start consuming is different at different times and
this generates a modulating effect on the total consump-
tion (fig. (2b)). On the other hand, at low asymmetry,
consumption propagatess slowly and waves of longer pe-
riod appear as shown in fig. (3c). We locate the transi-
tion at k1 ∼ 0.1. As k is decreased further, the period of
the waves (i.e. the length of the attractor) increases, as
can be observed from the right end side of fig.(4). As k
decreases below a certain value (k2 ∼ 1/27), waves dis-
appear and the system is attracted towards a fixed point.
The fixed point is characterized by either all agents con-
suming or nobody consuming.‡
‡These two configurations have the same utility as the trans-
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FIG. 3. Wave dynamics with parallel dynamics for
M = 1, T = 0, G = 0, C = 0 and top (a): k = ∞, center
(b): k = 1/4, bottom (c): k = 1/25. The dark color cor-
responds to those agents consuming and light color to those
not consuming. Wealth is increasing from left to right along
the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents time (here
t = 120 steps) which increases from top to bottom.
Note that in fig. (3c) at the beginning of each cycle con-
sumption propagates rather slowly but it spreads faster
as it moves down to the poorer. S-shaped curves, simi-
lar to those in fig.(2) have been observed in the case of
diffusion of innovation (Rogers 1995).
For sequential dynamics and k → ∞, as anticipated,
in the previous section, the system only exhibits 2-cycles
as depicted in fig. (5). Notice that after a short transient
period during which consumption is irregular, the system
ends into a periodic attractor characterized by agents
clustering into groups that synchronously alternate their
consumption behaviour. Starting with different initial
conditions affects the position and the number of clusters
which form. As we reduce k towards the low asymmetru
region the dynamics of sequential updating looks similar
to that of parallel dynamics although the length of the
attractors is shorter as can be seen from fig.(4).
For random sequential dynamics periodic attractors do
not exist. Nonetheless in the low asymmetry region waves
propagate through the system in a fashion similar to par-
allel and sequential dynamics. At very low k again the
dynamics converges to a fixed point where either all or
nobody is consuming.
formation Si → −Si is a symmetry of the system. The initial
condition determines towards which of the two states the sys-
tem relax.
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FIG. 4. Length of the attractor for M = 1, C = 0,
G = 0, T = 0 as a function of 1/k. We expand the region
at large k in the inset for parallel dynamics. The main figure
compare parallel dynamics (circles) with sequential dynamics
(triangles) in the low asymmetry limit.
(b) M > 1, T = 0, G = 0, C = 0
Adding finite memory to the system does not destroy
the waves but it changes their frequency and the corre-
sponding length of the attractor. This can be inspected
from fig.(6) where we have run the simulation with mem-
ory M = 1 for the initial 200 steps and then continued
from there on with M = 5. Fig.(7) shows how the length
of the attractor increases with M , with all other param-
eters fixed. In fig. (7) we compare two cases, one with
λ = 0 which corresponds to a non-fading memory, and
another with λ = 0.2, which corresponds to a slowly fad-
ing one. While at λ = 0 the dependence of < l > on
< M > is linear, for λ = 0.2 we observe that the length
of the attractor increases at a slower rate and eventually
saturates (when t is sufficietly large and αt ∼ 0).
(c) M ≥ 1, T > 0, G = 0, C > 0
We now examne the case of G = 0 and non-zero costs.
Costs are chosen randomly for each agent from the uni-
form distribution in the interval (−C, 0) and are fixed in
time.
Averaging over many realizations of agent’s wealth we
find the average critical value Cc = 0.58 ± 0.03 above
which, at T = 0, nobody consumes. Keeping the same
values for all the other parameters as before but tak-
ing C = 1.3 (which is well above Cc) we added noise.
FIG. 5. Consumption behaviour with sequential dynamics
when k =∞, M = 1, T = 0, G = 0, C = 0.
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FIG. 6. Total consumption with k = 1/25, C = 0,
G = 0, T = 0, and M = 1 for time t < 200 and M = 5
for t > 200.
The effect of noise is that it induces a certain number of
agents to consume despite the high costs. If the num-
ber of agents who consume exceeds a critical mass then
consumption waves, of varying amplitude, emerge spon-
taneously, even though at irregular time intervals (see
Fig. (8)). Adding memory has the effect to make this oc-
casional consumption waves more sparse. If T becomes
much larger, waves disappear and agents consume ran-
domly.
(d) M = 1, T = 0, G > 0, C > 0
We now consider the case of a “good” for which agents
manifest opposite preferences independently of their so-
cial status, i.e. the intrinsic value of the good hi is a
random number, constant in time, chosen for each agent
i independently from the interval (−G,G).
For G smaller that a certain value Gc we still found
periodic attractors with the length of the attractors de-
creasing with G increasing. Nonetheless we do not ob-
serve consumption waves propagating along the social
spectrum unless G is very small. On the other hand if
agents have strong preferences, the contribution of their
private utility dominates Ui in eq.(23), and only a frac-
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FIG. 7. Length of the attractor for k = 1/25, C = 0,
G = 0, T = 0 increasing M . Two cases are compared λ = 0
(circles) and λ = 0.2 (triangles).
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FIG. 8. Waves in consumption with k = 1/25, C = 1.3,
G = 0, T = 1 and (a) M = 1 (top), (b) M = 5 (bottom).
tion of agents update their decision under the influence
of the others. Eventually, when increasing G above Gc
the dynamics converges to a fixed point. Nonetheless the
fixed point is not only dictated by the private utility; the
social component modifies the natural distribution, i.e.
the one where Si has the same sign of hi.
Another interesting case is to consider a “status” good
which is designed to meet the needs of a specific group
of consumers. In this case we assume the good mainly
provides individual utility to consumers whose wealth is
distributed around a given value wm choosing:
hi = h(wi) =
G
(wi − wm)2 (42)
To analyze the interplay between the intrinsic value of
the good (here G) and the costs, we fix C to be larger
than Cc so that waves do not emerge in the case of a
fashion good (G = 0). Therefore it is only the intrinsic
value of the good which can trigger consumption.
The results which follow refer to the case k =
1/25, G = 1, T = 0,M = 1 and C = 0.5. Different
behaviours are found, depending on the position of the
maximum (wm) of h(wi). For wm < 85, (we remind
that the agents’ wealth is distributed between zero and
W0 = 100), the good enters the social spectrum around
wm, possibly migrates through the closest social classes
and then finds a stable niche (see top three cases in
Fig. (9)). Only when wm ∼W0 waves emerge and spread
throughout the whole social spectrum (bottom case in
Fig. (9)).
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FIG. 9. Consumption behaviour with parallel dynamics
when k = 1/25, C = 0.5, G = 1 T = 0, M = 1, and
wm = 10, 50, 80, 85 (from top to bottom). Dark (light) color
is for those consuming (not consuming). Only when the good
is suitable to the consumers located at the top of the social
scale a consumption wave propagates. In all other case the
good enters and finds a stable niche.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have focused on a potentially impor-
tant mechanism that drives consumption decision: the
interaction among heterogeneous consumers. Particular
attention has been paid to the role of the asymmetry
of interactions and the dynamical updating rules. In
the sociology literature, interactions among individuals,
belonging to similar or different social circles, are often
seen as a major mechanism that determines new styles
of behaviour. We studied how peering, distinction and
aspiration effects, in addition to the intrinsic values of a
good, generate different consumption patterns, under the
assumption that information about the consumption be-
haviour of agents is public (we imagined that each agent
knows the past behaviour of all other agents). Nonethe-
less collective behaviour may be affected by the structure
of the communication channels. To check the sensitivity
of our results with respect to the size of the reference
group of each agent we have examined the case where
individuals only communicate with a subset, chosen at
random, of the entire population. If the size of the sub-
sets is as small as 5% of the total population we still
observe (in the low asymmetry limit) waves propagating
through the system whose frequencies increase when k
decreases.
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